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 “Trade, of course, is neither inherently good nor bad; but 
how it is conducted in the future is now a matter of deep con-
cern—and unprecedented opportunity.”1
InTroducTIon
Sixteen	years	ago,	a	new	U.S.	President	offered	an	oppor-tunity	to	increase	North	American	environmental	protec-tion	with	an	environmental	side	agreement	to	the	North	
American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(“NAFTA”)	that	gave	citizens	
a	voice	in	enforcing	environmental	laws.2	The	side	agreement,	
known	 as	 the	North	American	Agreement	 on	Environmental	
Cooperation	 (“NAAEC”),	 provides	 a	mechanism	 for	 citizens	
to	aim	the	international	spotlight	on	a	government’s	failure	to	
enforce	 domestic	 environmental	 laws.3	 A	 similar	 agreement	
between	Chile	 and	Canada,	 the	Canada-Chile	Agreement	 on	
Environmental	Cooperation	(“CCAEC”),	allows	ordinary	citi-
zens	 to	 ask	 an	 international	 body	 to	 investigate	 alleged	non-
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws.4	While	 these	mechanisms	
are	 commonplace	 in	 a	 number	
of	 international	 trade	 agree-
ments,	 the	 U.S.-Chile	 Free	
Trade	Agreement	 (“USCFTA”)	
includes	a	state-to-state	dispute	
resolution	mechanism,	but	does	
not	allow	for	citizen	submissions	
on	enforcement.5	
As	 the	 international	 com-
munity	 turns	 its	 attention	 to	
environmental	 crises	 around	
the	 world,	 the	 United	 States	
must	decide	how	to	address	lax	
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws	by	its	trading	partners.6	While	
a	free	trade	agreement	is	only	one	avenue	for	the	United	States	
and	environmental	activists	 to	pursue	more	effective	enforce-
ment	of	every	country’s	environmental	laws,	this	article	argues	
that	a	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	is	a	vital	tool	that	must	be	
included	in	future	agreements.	Part	I	outlines	the	enforcement	
mechanisms	 under	 the	CCAEC,	NAAEC,	 and	 the	USCFTA.	
Part	 II	 argues	 that	 agreements	 without	 citizen	 enforcement	
mechanisms	cannot	effectively	increase	environmental	enforce-
ment,	while	agreements	with	these	provisions	encourage	interest	
in	environmental	issues	and	pressure	to	strengthen	environmen-
tal	regulations.	Part	III	recommends	including	citizen	enforce-
ment	mechanisms	in	future	U.S.	trade	agreements.	Finally,	Part	
IV	 concludes	 that	 free	 trade	 agreements	 offer	 an	 avenue	 for	
increased	enforcement	of	environmental	laws,	and	that	citizen	
enforcement	procedures	strengthen	those	agreements.	
backGround
ccaec & naaec citizen enforcement 
proceDureS
The	CCAEC	and	NAAEC	address	ineffective	enforcement	
of	domestic	environmental	laws	in	two	ways.	The	first	is	a	state-
to-state	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	 for	 a	 persistent	 failure	
to	enforce	a	party’s	own	environmental	laws	in	a	manner	that	
interferes	with	free	trade.7	The	second	is	a	citizen	submission	on	
enforcement	procedure.8	This	mechanism	allows	any	citizen	to	
send	a	submission	to	either	National	Secretariat	asserting	that	a	
party	to	the	CCAEC	or	NAAEC	is	“failing	to	effectively	enforce	
its	environmental	law.”9
The	 CCAEC	 established	 a	
Commission	for	Environmental	
Cooperation	(“CEC”)	made	up	
of	a	Council,	a	Joint	Submission	
Committee,	 and	 a	 Joint	 Pub-
lic	 Advisory	 Committee.10	 A	
citizen	 submission	 to	 the	CEC	
must	meet	seven	largely	proce-
dural	 criteria	 and	be	grounded	
in	 a	 specific	 incident	 of	 non-
enforcement.11	 The	 Joint	 Sub-
mission	 Committee	 decides	
whether	 the	 submission	merits	
a	response	from	the	state,	 then	
decides	 whether	 to	 produce	 a	
public	 factual	 record.12	While	
the	intent	of	the	factual	record	is	
to	describe	and	report	events	without	passing	judgment	on	par-
ties’	actions,	parties	still	resist	the	process.13	
uScfta environmental State-to-State DiSpute 
reSolution proceDureS
Like	the	CCAEC	and	NAAEC,	the	USCFTA	obliges	both	
parties	to	“effectively	enforce”	domestic	environmental	laws.14	
The	process	can	only	begin	if	a	party	has	persistently	failed	to	
effectively	enforce	its	environmental	laws	“in	a	manner	affecting	
The United States must 
decide how to address 
lax enforcement of 
environmental laws by its 
trading partners.
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trade	between	the	Parties.”15	Under	the	CCAEC,	a	citizen	can	
pursue	an	enforcement	matter	for	a	single	failure	to	effectively	
enforce	an	environmental	law.16	The	dispute	settlement	provi-
sions	of	the	USCFTA,	however,	are	strictly	between	government	
parties,	and	require	both	a	persistent	pattern	of	non-enforcement	
and	a	showing	that	the	failure	affects	trade	between	the	parties.17	
Parties	first	address	disputes	under	the	environmental	provi-
sions	of	the	USCFTA	with	consultations.18	If	consultations	fail	
to	resolve	the	matter	within	sixty	days,	the	complaining	party	
can	initiate	the	USCFTA	dispute	resolution	procedures.19	First,	
the	 parties	 convene	 a	 meeting	
of	 the	 Commission	 to	 resolve	
the	 issue.20	 Next,	 the	 parties	
convene	an	arbitral	panel	 if	 the	
issue	remains	unresolved.21	The	
panel	can	impose	fines	of	up	to	
fifteen	million	dollars	per	day	on	
the	 non-enforcing	 party.22	 The	
complaining	party	 can	 suspend	
USCFTA	 trade	 benefits	 if	 the	
party	fails	to	pay	the	fine.23	
analysIs
effective enforcement of environmental lawS 
protect the environment, human health, anD 
foreign inveStment StreamS
Environmental	 laws	 do	 not	 enforce	 themselves;	 govern-
ments	or	private	citizens	must	enforce	those	laws.24	The	impor-
tance	of	enforcement	is	especially	true	in	Latin	America,	where	
many	countries	have	an	inconsistent	historical	relationship	with	
the	rule	of	 law.25	Effective	environmental	protection	requires	
both	effective	environmental	laws	and	consistent	enforcement	
of	those	laws.26	
Foreign	and	domestic	investors	are	unlikely	to	comply	with	
environmental	laws	if	there	are	no	consequences	for	violations.	
Because	environmental	compliance	can	be	expensive,	compa-
nies	and	investors	that	violate	environmental	regulations	gain	a	
competitive	advantage	against	those	who	do	comply.	Effective	
enforcement	reassures	investors	that	competitors	are	not	gain-
ing	a	competitive	advantage	by	avoiding	environmental	com-
pliance.27	Overall,	trade	and	investment	that	leads	to	increased	
prosperity	may	strengthen	effective	environmental	protections,	
but	the	government	or	citizens	must	enforce	those	protections.28	
State-to-State DiSpute reSolution alone DoeS 
not increaSe enforcement of environmental lawS
While	 state-to-state	 dispute	 resolution	 theoretically	 pro-
vides	a	venue	for	environmental	advocates	to	work	though	their	
governments,	 government	 action	 carries	 burdens	 that	 make	
action	unlikely.29	States	have	neither	the	capacity	nor	authority	
to	effectively	monitor	enforcement	of	another	state’s	environ-
mental	laws.30	The	absence	of	a	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	
and	 the	requirement	 that	 the	disputed	pattern	of	non-enforce-
ment	affect	trade	between	the	parties	hampers	efforts	to	improve	
environmental	protection	through	treaty	provisions.31	
State	Espousal	Mechanisms	Lead	to	Mutual	Non-
Enforcement
Both	states	in	a	free	trade	agreement	have	non-environmen-
tal	reasons	to	sign	an	agreement.32	As	a	result,	environmental	
disputes	are	unlikely	because	each	state	has	an	interest	 in	not	
enforcing	 environmental	 provisions	of	 the	 treaty.33	A	 citizen	
alleging	that	her	government	has	failed	to	enforce	environmen-
tal	laws	has	little	control	over	the	diplomatic	concerns	of	either	
government	party	to	the	treaty.34	Because	environmental	issues	
are	not	a	priority,	neither	party	has	
an	interest	in	enforcing	environ-
mental	treaty	provisions.	At	the	
same	 time,	 the	 consequences	
of	state-to-state	dispute	resolu-
tion	are	 trade	sanctions,	which	
undermine	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
agreement:	 free	 trade.35	 As	 a	
result,	 no	 party	 has	 used	 the	
NAAEC	 or	 CCAEC	 govern-
ment	 arbitration	 provisions	 or	
the	USCFTA	state-to-state	dis-
pute	resolution	procedures.36	
High	Burdens	of	Proof	Make	an	Unused	Procedure	More	
Difficult
The	USCFTA	provides	a	dispute	resolution	mechanism	for	
state	parties	to	pursue	trade	sanctions.37	A	state	party	must	show	
that	 there	 is	 a	persistent	pattern	of	non-enforcement	 and	 that	
the	pattern	affects	trade	between	Chile	and	the	United	States.38	
These	hurdles	to	successful	sanctions	are	high	even	if	a	state	had	
an	incentive	to	pursue	a	dispute.39	
The	state	must	first	show	that	there	was	a	persistent	pattern	
of	non-enforcement.40	Effective	enforcement	 requires	consis-
tency	to	be	effective,	but	enforcement	in	Latin	America	is	more	
likely	to	be	inconsistent,	precluding	proof	of	a	consistent	pat-
tern.41	Second,	a	state	must	show	that	the	pattern	of	non-enforce-
ment	affected	trade	between	the	countries.42	For	example,	the	
state	could	show	that	non-enforcement	gives	domestic	facilities	
in	the	complained-against	country	an	advantage	over	facilities	in	
the	complaining	country.43	In	a	complex	global	economy,	a	state	
is	unlikely	to	be	able	to	prove	a	specific	impact	on	trade	between	
the	parties.44	These	high	burdens	of	proof	substantially	limit	the	
already	unlikely	state-to-state	dispute	resolution	procedure.	
a citizen enforcement proceDure iS a better 
mechaniSm for increaSing enforcement of 
environmental lawS anD promoting public 
intereSt in the environment
A	citizen	enforcement	mechanism	strikes	a	balance	between	
state	 sovereignty	and	 the	public	desire	 for	a	cleaner	environ-
ment.45	Because	citizen	submissions	do	not	rely	on	government	
action,	countries	cannot	subsume	environmental	issues	to	other	
diplomatic	concerns.46	Enforcement	of	domestic	law	preserves	
state	interest	in	sovereignty	because	the	treaty	does	not	impose	
an	international	standard.47	At	the	same	time,	a	defined	mecha-
nism	for	action	fosters	civil	society	interest	in	the	environment.48
No state party has used 
the state-to-state dispute 
resolution procedures
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Citizen	Submissions	Do	Not	Rely	on	a	Government	to	
Initiate	Treaty	Enforcement	Actions
Unlike	state-to-state	dispute	resolution,	the	citizen	submis-
sion	process	provides	a	venue	for	citizens	to	report	instances	of	
non-enforcement	in	their	own	neighborhoods	or	in	a	protected	
area	used	by	the	public.49	Citizens	have	an	interest	in	protecting	
the	natural	areas	they	use,	and	are	
more	likely	to	report	a	failure	to	
enforce	 than	 the	government.50	
Citizens	 can	 directly	 observe	
environmental	 violations	 and	
a	 lack	 of	 state	 action	 in	 their	
neighborhoods.51	 In	 contrast,	
limited	 resources	 restrict	 state	
monitoring	 of	 another	 state’s	
enforcement	activity.52	Citizens	
and	other	private	actors	are	also	
better	equipped	to	identify	inef-
fective	 enforcement	 because	
they	are	closer	to	violations.53	
Citizen	Submissions	Balance	
State	Sovereignty	and	Public	
Interest	in	Enforcement	of	
Environmental	Laws
Relying	on	citizen	enforcement	addresses	the	widespread	
concern	of	Latin	American	countries	that	environmental	provi-
sions	in	free	trade	agreements	are	an	effort	to	restrict	their	sov-
ereignty	with	outside	standards.54	The	CAAEC’s	requirement	
to	enforce	domestic	environmental	laws	allows	a	country	to	set	
a	level	of	environmental	protection	it	feels	is	appropriate.55	At	
the	same	time,	as	an	environmental	community	develops,	that	
community	can	pressure	 the	government	 to	 increase	levels	of	
environmental	protection	and	enforcement.56	States	also	see	the	
citizen	submission	as	a	lesser	threat	because	of	the	absence	of	
trade	sanctions	associated	with	a	factual	record.57	
Enforcement	of	domestic	environmental	law	imposes	lower	
sovereignty	costs	on	Latin	American	states.58	Because	only	citi-
zens	can	initiate	the	submission	process,	the	process	does	not	
raise	concerns	of	 a	 lack	of	democratic	 accountability.59	As	a	
community	of	environmental	activists	develops,	that	community	
can	lobby	for	more	protective	environmental	laws,	making	the	
government	more	responsive	to	community	concerns.	
In	contrast	to	the	dispute	resolution	proceeding	under	the	
USCFTA,	the	citizen	submission	process	does	not	carry	a	direct	
threat	of	trade	sanctions	and	instead	relies	on	the	deterrent	effect	
of	factual	records.60	This	limitation	preserves	the	benefits	of	the	
free	 trade	 agreement	while	 providing	 consequences	 for	 non-
enforcement	of	 the	 terms	of	 the	agreement.61	The	absence	of	
trade	sanctions	also	prevents	a	state-to-state	dispute	resolution	
from	punishing	exporters	and	other	private	parties	who	might	
not	have	been	involved	in	the	state’s	non-enforcement.62	
Citizen	Enforcement	Fosters	the	Development	of	a	
Community	of	Environmental	Activists
While	the	citizen	submission	process	is	theoretically	acces-
sible	to	the	general	public	without	legal	assistance,	this	process	
can	be	more	successful	when	 there	 is	a	civil	society	commu-
nity	ready	to	bring	claims.63	At	the	same	time,	the	process’	con-
crete	avenue	for	action	provides	a	
mechanism	 for	 environmental	
organizations	 in	 more	 devel-
oped	 countries	 to	 work	 with	
growing	organizations	 in	Latin	
America.64	 These	 connections	
between	environmental	 organi-
zations	 foster	 the	 development	
of	 the	 environmental	 commu-
nity,	 strengthening	 domestic	
environmental	 protections	 as	
well	 as	 the	 citizen	 submission	
process.65	Some	criticize	the	cit-
izen	submission	process	because	
it	does	not	legally	bind	the	gov-
ernment	 to	 take	 any	 action.66	
However,	even	a	limited	citizen	
submission	 process	 is	 a	 valuable	
tool	for	environmental	advocates	to	pressure	government	actors	
to	pursue	environmental	protection.67	
recommendaTIons
As	long	as	the	United	States	continues	to	expand	free	trade	
with	Latin	America,	free	trade	agreements	should	include	a	citi-
zen	enforcement	mechanism.	To	ensure	citizens	have	environ-
mental	laws	to	monitor,	the	United	States	should	refrain	from	
signing	 agreements	with	 states	 that	 do	 not	 have	 an	 effective	
legal	framework	for	environmental	protection.	While	access	to	a	
citizen	submission	process	will	not	immediately	provide	effec-
tive	environmental	protection,	it	is	an	important	step.	
incluDe a citizen SubmiSSion on enforcement 
mechaniSm in future free traDe agreementS
While	 the	 CCAEC	 citizen	 submission	 process	 is	 weak	
when	compared	to	U.S.	citizen	suit	provisions,	the	process	is	an	
innovative	mechanism	in	international	law.68	Historically,	pri-
vate	citizen	action	in	the	international	arena	was	only	available	
through	state	action,	but	citizen	submissions	allow	governments	
to	 stay	 an	 arm’s	 length	 from	 the	 proceedings.	 States	 cannot	
accuse	other	governments	of	manipulating	 the	environmental	
dispute	resolution	process	for	other	purposes	because	the	sub-
mission	process	does	not	involve	government	action.	
A	citizen	submission	mechanism	harnesses	 the	collective	
knowledge	of	 citizens	 to	 identify	 instances	of	 environmental	
non-enforcement.69	 State	 interests	 in	 preserving	 sovereignty	
would	likely	limit	any	effort	for	states	to	monitor	each	others’	
domestic	environmental	enforcement.70	A	citizen	enforcement	
mechanism	balances	 the	public	 interest	 in	consistent	enforce-
ment	and	the	state	interest	in	sovereignty.	
Because citizen 
submissions do not rely 
on government action, 
countries cannot subsume 
environmental issues to 
other diplomatic 
concerns
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At	the	same	time,	the	CEC	governing	bodies	should	have	
more	freedom	to	prepare	factual	records	without	political	inter-
ference.71	The	practical	consequences	of	a	factual	record	are	lim-
ited	to	public	disclosure	of	state	action,	and	the	state	can	blunt	
criticism	of	any	absence	of	enforcement	with	future	enforcement	
action.72	Because	treaties	require	enforcement	of	domestic	law,	
not	of	a	politically	unattainable	international	standard,	govern-
ments	should	be	able	to	effectively	enforce	their	own	domestic	
law.73	Overall,	a	citizen	submission	process	within	a	free	trade	
agreement	can	be	an	effective	mechanism	to	improve	enforce-
ment	of	environmental	laws	if	the	CEC	has	the	political	freedom	
to	pursue	factual	records.74	A	trading	partner,	however,	needs	
a	basic	environmental	framework	before	increased	enforcement	
will	increase	environmental	protection.
Do not enact free traDe 
agreementS with StateS 
that Do not proviDe 
for environmental 
protection
While	a	citizen	submission	
process	 can	 increase	 effective	
enforcement	 of	 environmental	
laws,	 increased	enforcement	of	
laws	 that	 do	 not	 exist	 cannot	
protect	the	environment.	While	
some	argue	that	free	trade	brings	
increased	 prosperity	 that	 will	
in	 turn	 increase	 environmental	
protections,	 investor	protection	
provisions	 in	 free	 trade	 agree-
ments	are	a	threat	to	new	envi-
ronmental	laws.75	Because	of	these	
investor	 protection	 provisions,	 effective	 environmental	 laws	
must	be	in	place	before	a	free	trade	agreement	can	improve	their	
enforcement.76	
While	 the	United	States	and	Chile	enacted	 the	USCFTA	
after	Chile	had	achieved	a	high	level	of	environmental	protection,	
the	recent	U.S.-Peru	Agreement	does	not	increase	environmen-
tal	protection.77	Peru	has	environmental	laws,	but	those	laws	do	
not	meet	the	“high	level”	of	environmental	protection	required	
by	the	treaty.78	Trade	agreements	can	foster	increased	environ-
mental	enforcement,	but	only	if	the	partner	country	has	effective	
environmental	laws.	If	increasing	environmental	protection	is	a	
goal	of	the	United	States	and	other	developed	countries,	those	
countries	should	not	sign	trade	agreements	with	countries	that	
lack	legal	environmental	protection.
conclusIon
While	 inclusion	of	 any	 environmental	 provisions	 in	 free	
trade	 agreements	 is	 a	 step	 forward,	 lip	 service	 to	 increased	
enforcement	of	environmental	laws	is	not	sufficient.	Effective	
enforcement	of	domestic	environmental	laws	should	be	a	stan-
dard	 condition	 of	 future	 U.S.	
free	trade	agreements.	Allowing	
state-to-state	dispute	 resolution	
on	 environmental	 issues	 is	 not	
sufficient	 to	 actually	 increase	
enforcement	 because	 states	
tend	 to	 rely	 on	 mutual	 non-
enforcement	when	 there	are	no	
other	 consequences.	 A	 citizen	
submission	on	enforcement	pro-
cess	 is	much	more	 effective	 at	
increasing	enforcement	because	
it	 takes	advantage	of,	and	even	
increases,	 public	 awareness	 of	
non-enforcement.	While	 a	 citi-
zen	 enforcement	 process	 alone	
will	not	solve	the	world’s	envi-
ronmental	 problems,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 step	 towards	 increas-
ing	 government	 accountability	 for	 effective	 enforcement	 of	
environmental	laws.	
Effective environmental 
laws must be in place 
before a free trade 
agreement can improve 
their enforcement
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